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In this paper we examine a set of issues at the nexus of domestic competition policy
and international trade, the interaction between international goods trade and domestic
market structure in trade and distribution sectors. Rules and regulations governing
international trade and investment in services are an increasingly important aspect of
regional and multilateral trade agreements (Mattoo and Sauve 2003). International
negotiations have focused on regulatory restrictions and barriers to cross-border trade
and FDI, while research has emphasized quantifying barriers and exploring the role of
traded services as inputs to the manufacturing sector. This includes Arnold, Mattoo, and
Smarzynska (2006), Francois (1990), Ito and Krueger (2003), and Markusen (1989). We
depart from this literature, highlighting the impact of domestic market power in margin
services on goods trade. These margin activities include domestic shipping and logistic
services, of course, as well as the wholesale and retail sectors and other links in the
distribution chain that carries imported goods to the industrial or household consumer.
In a very real sense these services make possible any interaction between producers and
exporters in one country and ﬁnal consumers in another.
Focusing on market structure in the domestic service sector and its impact on trade
in goods, we are able to identify linkages between service sector competition and the
value of negotiated market access concessions in goods. An important ﬁnding is that
ignoring the structure of the domestic service sector may lead to serious overestimation
of the market access beneﬁts of actual negotiated tariﬀ reductions. We also ﬁnd that the
market structure of margin sectors matters more for poor and small exporters than for
others. Finally, our results suggest that while negotiated agreements leading to cross-
border services liberalization may boost goods trade as well, they may also lead to a fall
in goods trade when such liberalization involves FDI leading to increased service sector
concentration.
1In exploring these issues, we are highlighting an important though somewhat ig-
nored aspect of the trading system. In the European Union, for example, internal trade
in motor vehicles has been hampered by an antitrust exemption for the distribution and
servicing of automobiles. (See both Flam and Nordstr¨ om 1995, and Lutz 2004.) Access
to the distribution system was also at the heart of a dispute between the United States
and Japan involving Kodak and Fuji ﬁlm (Nanto 1998). These issues also lurk behind
the impact on trade of the retail distribution systems both in Switzerland and Japan,
as well as the German experience with retailing cartels and the threat of foreign retail
entry to established domestic players. With the elimination of trade barriers for textiles
and clothing under the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005, the market
power of such huge buyers as Wal-Mart may also be an important factor in the transmis-
sion of price and quantity changes across global textile and clothing markets. Finally,
evidence is emerging that the beneﬁts of non-reciprocal tariﬀ preference schemes may be
captured by high-income country importing ﬁrms, rather than the low-income country
exporter ﬁrms for which the programs are intended. (See, for example, Olarreaga and
Ozden 2005.1)
We proceed in this paper as follows. In Section 2 we develop a basic analytical
model, involving a domestic distribution sector with market power. It sources both
internationally and domestically. We work with this model to examine the impact of
imperfect competition in services for the pattern of trade in goods. In Sections 3 and
4, we then examine the impact on gains from trade for both importers and exports.
In Section 5, we work with data on competition in distribution and sales in several
OECD countries, examining econometrically the issues highlighted in Sections 3 and 4.
This involves modeling the interaction between import protection, competition, and the
pattern of trade in the context of a gravity model of trade. We ﬁnd that imperfect
1There is also a nascent literature focused on international aspects of competition policy, including
Head and Ries (1997), Francois and Horn (2006), and Horn and Levinsohn (2001). However, this
literature is not concerned with the interaction between market access and antitrust policy so much as
with open economy aspects of merger policy and the beggar-thy-neighbor potential of antitrust.
2competition in the trade and distribution sectors matters most in the context of free
trade areas and customs unions, like the European Union. In the EU, we ﬁnd intra-
EU trade barriers linked to market structure variation in these sectors higher than the
average external EU tariﬀ. We also ﬁnd that market power translates into reduced
trade performance when the size and development (i.e. the bargaining power) of trading
partners is unbalanced. We oﬀer concluding comments in Section 6.
2 The Basic Model
We focus on the market for imports of a good q that competes directly with a domestic
industry. Our primary interest is in the domestic sale and distribution network which
we assume to be less-than-perfectly competitive. It exercises market power in sourcing
from both domestic and foreign suppliers, and in sales to ﬁnal consumers.
Imports are supplied by competitive, overseas producers. Export and domestic sup-
ply are imperfectly elastic. Consequently, due to increasing marginal cost of production,
the importing country has some degree of monopoly power in trade. It subjects trade
in these goods to an import tax at rate t. This creates a wedge between the cif price
pcif and the landed (that is, after duties are paid) import price pm. Export supply qm
is represented by the inverse supply function (1).
pcif = am + bmqm (1)
where pcif is the export price at the border while landed prices inclusive of tariﬀs are
pm = τ pcif where τ ≡ (1 + t) (2)
Similarly, domestic supply qd is an increasing function of domestic price, as reﬂected in
3the inverse domestic supply schedule (3).
pd = ad + bdqd (3)
Consumer demand for the imported good is deﬁned by the inverse demand curve (4).
p = x − y(qd + qm) (4)
where x and y are constants deﬁning our demand curve. Interaction between suppliers
and ﬁnal consumers takes place through the services of a domestic service sector that
facilitates both the movement of imported goods inland and wholesale and retail distri-
bution, marketing, and any ancillary services required to sell the goods. These services
are supplied by a domestic service sector – modeled as a Cournot oligopoly – at constant
marginal cost.2 The total revenue of a representative ﬁrm i in the service sector is:
Ri = p(qmi + qdi) (5)
where qmi and qdi are the quantity of imports sold by a representative intermediary
ﬁrm i. We further assume that there are n identical ﬁrms in the service market, each
having a share s = 1/n of sales. It proves useful to deﬁne the index σ ≡ 1 + s as an
index of market competitiveness that ranges from a value of 1 to 2. A value of σ = 1
implies perfect competition (n = ∞) while σ = 2 maps to a single ﬁrm monopolizing
distribution (n = 1). In equilibrium, we may also have σ = 2 where the service sector
acts as a monopolist through perfect collusion in a cartel. Assuming a constant marginal
cost c, proﬁts of service ﬁrm i are:
πsi = pqi − (pm + c)qmi − (pd + c)qdi (6)
2The Cournot approach followed here allows us a direct way to manipulate market structure – through
induced entry.
4From the ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization, quantities will be
qd = [τbmG + y (G − H)]/A (7)
qm = [bdH + y (H − G)]/A (8)
q = [τbmG + bdH]/A (9)
where A ≡ σ (ybd + τbm (y + bd)) > 0,
G ≡ x − c − ad,
and H ≡ x − c − τam
The split between imported and domestically sourced q will depend on relative import
and domestic supply conditions and the tariﬀ rate τ.3
3 Markups, Tariﬀs, and Importer Welfare
It is evident that service-sector ﬁrms have power on both sides of the market. Their
proﬁts are a function of manipulating double margins. On the input side, the price
they pay for imports and domestic goods depends on the total quantity bought and the
sensitivity of supply to quantity. Similarly, on the demand side, the price at which they
sell to consumers is a function of total quantity brought to market. By restricting their
trading, the ﬁrms are able to both drive down costs in both supply markets and drive up
prices, widening the price-cost margin and boosting proﬁts. The service-sector margins
amount to:
µd = G(σ − 1)/σ + c (10)
µm = H (σ − 1)/σ + c (11)
3We are working here with distributors who are willing to source both domestically, internationally, or
both. While beyond the focus of this paper, it would also be interesting to explore exclusive distribution
networks in the context of open economies.
5Equations (10) and (11) lead directly to the following propositions.
Proposition 1. The Cournot-Nash mark-up on imports for the domestic trade and
distribution sectors is a decreasing function of the underlying import tariﬀ.
Proposition 2. The Cournot-Nash mark-up on domestic shipments for the domestic
trade and distribution sectors is independent of the underlying import tariﬀ.
The mark-up over marginal cost for imports declines directly with the tariﬀ. Any
attempt on the part of the government to exercise its monopoly power in trade eclipses
the ability of the service sector to exercise its market power in the same market. What is
the interaction between tariﬀs, market power, and the volume of trade? Diﬀerentiating

















This allows us to make the following propositions.
Proposition 3. Despite the presence of an imperfectly competitive service sector, it
remains the case that international trade volumes decline with increases in the import
tariﬀ.
Proposition 4. International trade volumes are inversely related to the degree of con-
centration in the domestic trade and distribution sector, or alternatively the degree of
market power exercised in the domestic distribution sector.
Proposition 5. The negative impact of a marginal change in market power on trade
volumes is greatest in a zero tariﬀ context, and its marginal impact falls with increased
6levels of import protection or concentration. Hence, the largest impact of imperfect com-
petition in the service sectors will be observed in zero-tariﬀ countries, free-trade areas,
customs unions, and under non-reciprocal trade preferences.
We focus next on the welfare implications of a range of alternative tariﬀ regimes for
the importer, and the role played by service-sector competition across these possibilities.
Domestic welfare W is comprised of four elements: service sector proﬁts πs, domestic
upstream producer proﬁts πd, consumer surplus CS, and tariﬀ revenue TR. Thus:
W = πs + πd + CS + TR (14)
An explicit expression for service-sector proﬁts is obtained by combining equations (6),
(7), and (8).
πs = (σ − 1)[bdH2 + τbmG2 + y (G − H)
2]/σA (15)
As both the service-sector proﬁt margin and the volume of trade decline with the tariﬀ,
proﬁts of intermediaries decline as the trade tax is increased. The economic proﬁts of
the upstream sector can be measured directly by the area between the domestic supply
curve and its intersection with the domestic ex-factory price. Combining equations (3)
and (7) yields equation (16).
πd = bd[τbmH + y(G − H)]
2/2A2 (16)
Similarly, consumer surplus CS is simply the familiar triangle under the demand curve
(4) and above the ﬁnal demand price p. This is represented by equation (17).
CS = y (τbmG + bdH)
2 /2A2 (17)
7Finally, tariﬀ revenue follows directly from equation (8).
TR = (τ − 1){adA + bm [bdH + y(H − G)]}[bdH + y(H − G)]/A2 (18)

























Figure 1: Welfare decomposition with varying rates of τ
function of the basic coeﬃcients of our model. If we then take ﬁrst-order conditions for
welfare maximization, we can solve for the optimal tariﬀ as a function of σ and the basic
8demand and supply coeﬃcients of the model. This yields equation (19).
τ∗ =
bdy[(σ − 1)J − σamK] − 2bmJK
[ambm(σ − 2)K − σbmJ − ambdy]K
(19)
where J ≡ bd(x − c) + ady
and K ≡ bd + y
Figure 1 illustrates domestic welfare and its components for the case of duopoly in
the service sector.4 As would be expected, consumer surplus declines monotonically
with an increasing tariﬀ, while tariﬀ revenue increases to a maximum and then falls.
Consequently, for national welfare, there is an interior solution for the optimal tariﬀ,
indicated by τ∗ in the ﬁgure. The loss to the service sector and consumers (πd and CS)
from an increasing tariﬀ rate τ is more than oﬀset to the left of the optimal tariﬀ by the
combination of rising domestic proﬁts for upstream producers πd and tariﬀ revenue TR,
while it is only partially oﬀset to the right of the optimal tariﬀ line. The government,
in exercising its monopoly power in trade, has the ability to limit the ability of the
service sector to extract rents. As has already been established, the proﬁts of the service
sector decline with the tariﬀ. Consequently when these rents accrue to domestic agents,
the government will wish to moderate its use of the tariﬀ. Indeed, viewed from the
perspective of the optimal volume of imports q∗
m the trade-oﬀ is complete. This can be






From equation (20), we can see that from a welfare perspective optimal imports are
independent of the degree of market power in the domestic service sector. The coeﬃcient
σ does not appear in equation (20). In exercising the optimal tariﬀ, the government
4The coeﬃcient values used in Figures 1 and 2 are σ = 1.5, am = ad = 10, bm = bd = 2, y = 1,
x = 20, c = 1.
9would seek to target the optimal volume of imports by adjusting the tariﬀ rate τ to
compensate for variations in service sector market power σ. As a result, the optimal
tariﬀ is a strictly decreasing function of the degree of market power in the service sector.




(J − amK)(ambdy + bmα)(bdy + 2bmβ)
[ambm(σ − 2)K − σbmJ − ambdy]2K
(21)
The sign of equation (21) is negative whenever q∗
m > 0. These relationships are illustrated
in Figure 2, where we plot optimized tariﬀs, welfare, and quantities for a range of
competition index values. The ﬁgure is based on the same set of model coeﬃcients
as in Figure 1. The key diﬀerence is that we are now varying our index of competition σ
and then plotting optimum quantities q∗
m and q∗
d, along with welfare W and the optimum
tariﬀ t∗ = (τ − 1). As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the optimal tariﬀ rate falls with our
market power index σ, as does welfare W and domestic shipments qd, while from equation
(20) imports remain ﬁxed. With the additional distortion in the market, in the form of
an imperfectly competitive distribution sector, the welfare implications of trade policy
become more complicated. It is evident that the optimal tariﬀ declines with increasing
concentration in services. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2, the optimal tariﬀ when the
service sector is a monopoly is a subsidy. In the absence of such an optimal tariﬀ oﬀset
by the government, the more concentrated the service sector, the greater its exercise
of its market power and, consequently, the lower the trade volume. A tariﬀ further
reduces the volume of trade, whereas a subsidy increases the level of imports and hence
consumption. Such a subsidy beneﬁts the service sector but, as their proﬁts are part of
national welfare, a welfare maximizing government would be prepared to oﬀer it. We
summarize the relationship between tariﬀs, proﬁts, trade, and welfare in the following
propositions:
Proposition 6. The optimum import tariﬀ is a decreasing function of the degree of
10market power in the domestic trade and distribution sectors, and with a domestic service
monopoly or cartel, the optimum tariﬀ may actually be a subsidy.
Proposition 7. There is scope for either the private service sector (through markups)
or the government (through tariﬀs) to exercise market power in international trade, with
the optimum tariﬀ implying direct substitution.












Figure 2: The optimal tariﬀ and welfare when varying σ
4 Market Access and the Exporter
Consider the impact of alternative tariﬀ and competition regimes for the exporter. If
we are focused on quantity alone, then equations (8), (12) and (13) point to a negative
relationship between tariﬀs and imperfect competition, on the one hand, and export
11volumes on the other. In addition, taking the cross-derivative from equation (13) we can
see that the trade-volume eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction depends on the underlying trade
volume and hence on the degree of competition in the domestic distribution sector. To
some extent, tariﬀ reductions may simply lead to a greater exercise of market power
by the domestic distribution sector (and vice-versa), nullifying expected direct beneﬁts
from tariﬀ reductions in export markets. A second measure of the beneﬁts of improved
market access conditions is exporter producer surplus PS. Once again, this is simply
the area of a triangle, in this instance the area between the inverse supply curve and the
export price:
PS =
bdH + y (H − G)
2A2 (22)
From equation (22) we can calculate the welfare beneﬁt to exporters of improved market




K (bmJ + amybd)
2A2 < 0 (23)
Further manipulation then conﬁrms that the PS beneﬁt of tariﬀ reductions is a decreas-




K (bmJ + amybd)
2σA2 > 0 (24)
We summarize this section with the following propositions.
Proposition 8. The market-access beneﬁts of tariﬀ reductions in export markets are
inversely related to the degree of market power exercised by the domestic trade and dis-
tribution sector in the export market.
Proposition 9. The beneﬁts of market access concessions can be oﬀset by increases in
the degree of market power exercised by the domestic trade and distribution sector in the
export market.
12The ﬁrst of these propositions formalizes the dependence of goods market integration
in the European Union (recall the EU autos exemption) on distribution sector competi-
tion. The second goes directly to the heart of the Fuij-Kodak dispute. To use a technical
GATT/WTO term, nulliﬁcation and impairment can follow from changes in domestic
regulation of the distribution sector.
5 Empirics
We turn next to an empirical exercise, focusing on whether the basic eﬀects we have
discussed, imperfect competition in distribution aﬀecting market access in goods, matters
in an empirical sense.his involves estimating reduced form gravity equations of bilateral
trade ﬂows, based on tariﬀs, distance, and exporter-speciﬁc dummies for a cross-section.
(See for example Disidier and Head 2003 and Anderson and van Wijncoop 2003.) We
include measures of distribution sector competition, as a check on our theoretical results
developed above.
Our basic data for this exercise are summarized in Table 1. From the OECD (2000),
we work with two estimates of the degree of competition in the road freight and retail
distribution for some, but not all, OECD members. This includes an index of barriers to
entry in the sector, and also what can be interpreted as an overall or composite index of
the degree of competition in the sector. These estimates provide a single set of indexes for
the late 1990s. For trade, we work with bilateral merchandise trade data extracted from
UNCTAD’s COMTRADE database and matched to bilateral import protection data
taken from GTAP (2005). These data are for 2001. The tariﬀ data oﬀer the advantage
of including a bottom-up concordance from detailed tariﬀ data to aggregate bilateral
trade ﬂows, including preferential tariﬀ rates. We also have included estimates of the
trade-tax equivalent of export barriers as part of the basic trade barrier data (primarily
the quota regime on textiles and clothing). In addition, bilateral export data have been
13adjusted to reﬂect estimated freight margins. For 69 countries as exporters, we have
matched bilateral import data to other country-speciﬁc data for the 22 OECD importers
covered by our set of OECD indexes on the distribution and freight sectors. We also
incorporate data on distance, common language, and common borders from Guillaume,
Mayer and Zignago (2004). Finally, as we are unable to use importer dummies for this
exercise, we also include data on importer GDP and per-capita income from the World
Bank (2005), following the older (pre ﬁxed eﬀects) gravity literature. After matching
trade data to our competition data, we have 1,725 bilateral trade ﬂows to work with
involving OECD countries as importers in 2001.
Our estimating equation is a reduced-form gravity equation, utilizing the data dis-
cussed above and augmented to reﬂect our propositions based on equation (8). Since
we are working with a single year, using exporter dummies controls for fob prices, while
value ﬂows map to quantities if we normalize these prices to unity. Deﬁning imports by
country j from country i as Mi,j, we work with the following estimating equation.
qm,i,j = α0 + α1 ln(GDPj) + α2Disti,j + α3 ln(τi,j) + α4LANGi,j (25)





α9,iDi + α10NAFTAi,j + α11EEAi,j + εi,j
The Di terms are dummy variables assigned to each exporter, to reﬂect the set of
exporter-speciﬁc variables that remain ﬁxed across importers. The variables NAFTAi,j
and EEAi,j are also dummies, capturing joint membership in either the North American
or European free trade bloc. The terms Disti,j and Ti,j measure bilateral distance and
import barriers (a combination of trade-weighted import tariﬀs and trade tax equiva-
lents of export restraints) as a share of total import value. We expect the coeﬃcients
applied to these variables, α2 and α3 to both be negative. Recall that the Index term is
14meant to capture the eﬀects related to σ in the discussion above. From the expressions
in (8), we expect α6 to be negative as well. We expect the interaction term to be pos-
itive, based on equation (13) and Proposition 5. We have also included the interaction
term α8 to allow for possible variations in the impact of tariﬀ and competition-related
barriers depending on the level of development of the trading partner. We explore this
issue further below with split-sample regressions.
Table 2 presents robust regression results for equation (25), based on both versions of
our competition index. We have reported robust regression results because the Breusch-
Pagan (1979) Chi-squared test statistic (as implemented in STATA) leads us to reject
the hypothesis of homoscedasticity at any conceivably reasonable level of signiﬁcance.
Further examination with Szroeter’s (1978) test statistic points to a pervasive problem,
involving roughly half of the right hand side variables. Many of these relate to the ex-
porter ﬁxed eﬀect variables, indicating for example greater variance in the data involving
some exporting countries than others. This is not surprising, as we have included rela-
tively small aggregate trade ﬂows (all ﬂows over $10,000), usually involving a range of
least developing countries. In these cases, bilateral trade ﬂows may be a function of his-
torical/structural variables unique to a given country pairing. Given the pervasiveness
of the problem, there is a not an obvious single adjustment to be made to the data. We
therefore resort to robust least squares, involving Huber-type (1981) robust regressions
as implemented in STATA. These results are what are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Turning ﬁrst to Table 2, this reports the results for equation (25) with both indexes.
Relevant coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in the 0.05 to 0.01 range or better, with the sign
predicted from our theoretical analysis for the direct eﬀect from competition. (Where we
have expectations of sign, the one-tailed signiﬁcance results in the table are appropriate.
This includes both competition indexes.) An F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the
competition coeﬃcients α6 and α7 rejects the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are
jointly zero at the .001 level. Country ﬁxed-eﬀect coeﬃcients are not shown, though
15they are all generally signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level across all regressions. The pattern of
results for competition ﬁts expectations. Basically, these results suggest that tariﬀs and
reduced competition both have a dampening eﬀect on estimated trade ﬂows, consistent
with our theory-based propositions in the previous sections of this paper.
Table 3 presents a further decomposition of patterns in the data, based on split-
sample regressions. Implicit in the analysis above is that competition matters more
as importers have more market power. In terms of the previous section, this depends
on the relative slopes of the supply and demand schedules, in conjunction with the
general level of competition in the service sector itself. In a more general sense, we
may expect importing/distribution ﬁrms to have more market power vis-` a-vis smaller
suppliers. At the same time, exporters in lower income countries may be less organized,
and less adept, in holding their own against market power exercised by buyers. (Imagine
WalMart negotiating supplier contracts in Jamaica, as opposed to in Canada.) In Table
3 we explore this issue by making the following splits in the data. The ﬁrst split involves
OECD trade with low-income countries (deﬁned as having a per-capita income below
$1000 in 2001 dollars), and all other trade. For the second split, we divide the sample into
OECD trade where the importer is large (with a nominal GDP greater than $500billion)
and the exporter is small (deﬁned as having a nominal GDP below $100billion), versus
all other trade. For the ﬁnal split, we examine OECD trade where the importer is large
and the exporter is both poor and small. In all cases, we ﬁnd that the correlation in
the data between exports to the OECD and competition is greater when there is likely
to be greater market power, in the sense that it matters more for smaller and poorer
exporters. The structure of the retail and distribution sector in the OECD countries is
more of a trade barrier for small and low-income countries than it is for exporters from
higher income and larger economies.
Finally, Table 4 is our attempt to convey a sense of the magnitudes involved, not
so much statistically but rather economically. In the table, we have taken the tariﬀ
16coeﬃcient from Table 2, combined with sample values for EU competition indexes and a
competition coeﬃcient estimated for the intra-EU15 subset of our full sample. We have
used these to calculate a trading cost- or tariﬀ-equivalent from changing the degree of
competition in the sample of EU countries, for intra-EU (i.e. duty-free) trade. Hence,
for example, from the ﬁrst column of numbers in Table 4, moving France to the average
level of competition in distribution across the EU would be comparable to eliminating a
4.2 percent tariﬀ against its EU partners. Moving to the most competitive level in the
sample would correspond to the elimination of an 8.4 percent tariﬀ. In the table, these
trading cost equivalents range between 0.0 and 8.4 percent of the value of trade, with
most between 3.0 and 4.0 percent of the value of trade.
The patterns of results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest that variations in the degree of
domestic competition matters for trade. Indeed, problems with competition in domestic
distribution and trade activities are likely to themselves act as barriers to trade. In a
European context, this means that continued competition exemptions for automobiles,
for example, should indeed be expected to hinder trade substantially. In the context of
multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), this also means that
WTO-based liberalization of these service sectors under the GATS (General Agreement
on Trade in Services) may also mean improved market access conditions for aﬀected
goods sectors along the lines developed here. More broadly, this supports the notion
that the beneﬁts of trade for exportering countries is a function of their market power
vis-` a-vis trade and distribution ﬁrms in the importing countries. At the same time,
increased FDI ﬂows in the service sectors, if they lead to increased concentration and
less rather than more competition in distribution and trade services, ironically may lead
to an erosion of market access conditions for goods, both in a customs union and bilateral
setting.
176 Summary and Conclusions
The pattern of trade in goods depends on a number of factors. Recent work has stressed
transport costs and its linkages to the geography of production and trade. We take a
diﬀerent slant here. In this paper we examine the interaction between trade in goods
and the degree of market power exercised by the domestic trade and distribution sectors
– the so-called margin sectors. We ﬁrst develop a theoretical model that allows us to
highlight interactions between the degree of competition in domestic service sectors and
the pattern of trade in goods. This is followed by an econometric exercise involving the
import patterns of 22 OECD countries vis-´ a-vis 69 trading partners. Our theoretical
results point to an expected linkage between service sector competition and goods trade.
At least in theory, the domestic service sector can serve as an eﬀective import barrier.
This is also supported by our econometric results. These point to statistically signiﬁ-
cant linkages between eﬀective market access conditions for goods and the structure of
the service sector. From back of the envelope calculations, they also point to econom-
ically/qualitatively signiﬁcant eﬀects. (See Table 4.) What all this means is that, by
ignoring the structure of the domestic service sector, we may be seriously overestimating
the market access beneﬁts of actual tariﬀ reductions given the existence of imperfect
competition in the margin sectors. We also ﬁnd that the competition of margin sectors
matters more for poor and small exporters than for others. Finally, our results suggest
that GATS-based services liberalization may boost goods trade as well, if it leads to
more competition in the distribution and trade sectors. Where GATS-based liberaliza-
tion involves FDI and increased concentration, such service sector liberalization may
instead have the unintended eﬀect of eroding market access conditions for goods.
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20Table 1
Database Overview (Value Data Reported in logs)
name description mean max min
GDP Importer gross domestic product in 12.797 16.126 10.858
billions of dollars in 2001
Source: World Bank (2005).
PCI PPP-based per-capita income, dollars, 2001. 9.675 10.517 7.709
Source: World Bank (2002).
M Imports, millions of U.S. dollars in 2001. 4.695 12.011 -4.605
Source: UNCTAD COMTRADE and
GTAPv6.2 databases.
τ = 1 + t MFN trade-weighted tariﬀ (adjusted 0.028 0.670 -0.123
for trade preferences where available)
based on a concordance of WTO,
UNCTAD, and MACMAPS tariﬀ data.
Source: GTAPv6 database.
Dist Distance between national capitals, from 8.332 9.884 2.821
the CEPII database of distance measures.
Source: Gaulier, Mayer, and Zignago (2004).
Border Sharing a common border. 0.041 1.000 0.000
Source: Gaulier, Mayer, and Zignago (2004).
Lang Sharing a common language 0.059 1.000 0.000
Source: Gaulier, Mayer, and Zignago (2004).
Index1 Overall index of competition in the 0.735 1.548 -0.223
freight/distribution sectors.
Source: OECD (2000).
Index2 Index of barriers to entry in the 0.747 1.705 -0.357
freight/distribution sectors.
Source: OECD (2000).
NAFTA A dummy variable for the case where 0.005 1.000 0.000
importer and exporter are both in
the North American Free Trade Area.
EEA A dummy variable for the case where 0.221 1.000 0.000
importer and exporter are both in the
the European Economic Area.
Note: The scale of competition indexes in levels ranges from 0-6, for least to most
restrictive regimes. For countries reported as an interval by the OECD, the mid-point
has been used. Index data are available for 22 OECD countries. Trade data are grouped
by these 22 importers and by 69 exporting countries. Applied tariﬀ data and distance
data have been matched to these bilateral trade pairs.
21Table 2
Robust Regressions: Gravity Equation of Bilateral Trade
model 1 model 2
general index index of
of competition entry barriers
α1: GDPj 0.959 0.956
(62.86)*** (62.33)***
α2: Disti,j -1.057 -1.046
-(28.51)*** -(28.11)***
α3: ln(τi,j) -1.836 -1.994
-(3.30)*** -(3.60)***
α4: LANGi,j 0.599 0.595
(7.19)*** (7.14)***
α5: BORDERi,j -0.033 -0.001
-(0.30) -(0.01)
α6: ln(Indexj) -0.300 -0.242
-(7.73)*** -(7.80)***
α7: [ln(Indexj)ln(τi,j)] 4.527 8.020
(1.00) (2.24)**
α8: [ln(PCIi)ln(Indexj)ln(τi,j)] -0.778 -1.185
-(1.46)† -(2.77)***
α10: NAFTAi,j 0.631 0.684
(1.92)* (2.09)**
α11: EEAi,j -0.105 -0.158
-(0.99) -(1.48)†




F: H0(α0 = α1 = ... = α11 = 0), Pr > F 328.86, 0.0 318.59, 0.0
Summary statistics for OLS regressions
R2 0.878 0.877
Note: Robust regressions are estimating using Huber method as implemented in STATA, with default
convergence criteria. t-statistics are reported in parentheses †, *, **, and *** indicating 0.15, 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels of signiﬁcance for a two-tailed test, or 0.075, 0.05, 0.025, and 0.005 where a one-tailed
test is instead appropriate, as discussed in the text.
22Table 3, Robust Regression Estimates
Competition Coeﬃcients with Split Samples
model 1 model 2
general index index of
of competition entry barriers
Exporter is poor -0.339 -0.328
-(3.72)*** -(4.43)***
Rest of Sample -0.271 -0.193
-(6.46)*** -(5.78)***
A Large importer and a small exporter -0.366 -0.269
-(4.65)*** -(4.48)***
Rest of Sample -0.286 -0.239
-(6.93)*** -(6.77)***
A Large importer and a small, poor exporter -0.327 -0.299
-(2.46)*** -(2.75)***
Rest of Sample -0.279 -0.208
-(7.00)*** -(6.43)***
Note: Robust regressions are estimating using Huber method as implemented in STATA, with default
convergence criteria. t-statistics are reported in parentheses †, *, **, and *** indicating 0.15, 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels of signiﬁcance for a two-tailed test, or 0.075, 0.05, 0.025, and 0.005 where a one-tailed
test is instead appropriate, as discussed in the text.
23Table 4
Trade-cost Equivalents for Intra-EU Trade for Changes in
Competition in Member States, %
move to most
move to average competitive














Note: Based on competition index 1, Table 2 coeﬃcient for tariﬀs, and a split-sample regression estimate
of the competition index for the sub-sample of intra-EU trade.
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